Acquittal in Inca: Why the Verdict Raises More Questions Than It Answers

Acquittal in Inca: Why the Verdict Raises More Questions Than It Answers

Key question: Is proven sympathy for ISIS sufficient to speak of a concrete terrorist threat?

In the late afternoon in Inca, when the market at the Plaça des Born is slowly emptying and the church bells hang over the smell of freshly baked ensaimadas, people at the coffee machine discuss the court ruling. Six men, arrested in 2017, are now acquitted of the charge of having formed a jihadist cell. The court says: supporters of "the most radical line of Islam" yes, evidence for concrete attack plans no. For many here that sounds logical, for others disturbing.

The core of the ruling is legally simple and yet uncomfortable: inclination to commit a crime is not enough. The prosecution had sought prison terms of five to eight years; the judges found the evidence insufficient. Presented elements such as a four-part YouTube video, parts of which were filmed in Mallorca, radical propaganda material on computers, and monitored conversations were not enough to prove intent and concrete preparation.

Critical analysis: the court made legal boundaries visible. For a conviction you need more than sympathy, more than disturbing thought experiments. Nevertheless the alarm bell remains: intercepted conversations that mentioned running people down or slaughtering sounded like more than mere wishful fantasies. The difficulty lies in the standard of proof—and in how digital traces and propaganda can be interpreted in court.

What is missing in public discourse is a sober separation between security work and prevention. Often on social media the two are mixed: collecting radical videos does not necessarily make someone an attack planner. At the same time, this distinction could lead to overlooking potential threats, because investigators must concentrate on the highest level of proof.

Everyday scene: In front of the small supermarket on the Carrer Major two neighbors talk about the church and a nearby mosque that seems to some too conformist, to others too provocative. Inca is a manageable town; rumors spread quickly. Such neighborhood conversations show how close prevention work and stigmatization are.

Concrete solutions: First: Clear guidelines for handling digital propaganda material. Possession alone should not automatically criminalize someone, but its distribution and targeted use must be provable. Second: More transparency in surveillance measures and independent oversight so interventions remain proportionate. Third: Expansion of exit and deradicalization programs in the Balearics; prevention works locally, not only in the courtroom. Fourth: Training for judges and prosecutors on digital evidence and the psychological dynamics of group pressure and online radicalization. Fifth: Promotion of local dialogue forums between Muslim communities, schools and social services so concerns can be addressed openly and without stigmatization.

Bottom line: The court defended the rule-of-law standard—dangerous content alone is not enough for imprisonment. That is legally correct, but politically uncomfortable. Security policy must not slide into blanket condemnations; it also needs better tools to recognize threats earlier, in civil and targeted ways. Those who want to live in Inca between market stalls and mosque expect both: protection from attacks and protection from hasty stigmatization. Both require work, time and honest debates—not just court decisions.